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CHANGES IN POVERTY AND INEQUALITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Gary S. Fields 
 
Abstract 
 
 This paper presents new data on poverty, inequality, and 
growth in those developing countries of the world for which the 
requisite statistics are available. Economic growth is found 
generally but not always to reduce poverty. Growth, however, is 
found to have very little to do with income inequality. Thus the 
"economic laws" linking the rate of growth and the distribution 
of benefits receive only very tenuous empirical support here. 
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 For nearly two decades, the World Bank has had an abiding 
interest in the political economy of income distribution and 
economic growth. Research on income distribution that has 
emerged over the years has sought to increase the understanding 
of donors, policymakers, and academics on the important 
questions of who benefits from economic development, who is hurt 
by economic decline, and why. 
 How has income distribution changed with economic growth in 
the countries for which information is available? In 1985, the 
World Bank launched a research project on the political economy 
of poverty, equity, and growth. Its purpose was to "explore the 
processes of interactions between growth, equity and poverty 
alleviation particularly as they are affected by different types 
of public policies, using a combination of 'analytical history' 
and 'political economy.' " 
 This article summarizes data from the political economy 
project as well as other evidence. The results should be viewed 
as establishing the stylized facts of poverty, inequality, and 
growth rather than as tests of formal theories or of rigorous 
econometric models. In this article, the term "the poor" refers 
to those whose income falls below a figure established as the 
poverty line. "Poverty" may be used to indicate the extent to 
which the poor lag in income. The term "inequality" refers to 
disparities in income or income growth rate among groups. Some 
groups may experience greater proportional gains in income than 
do others. Inequality increases if the income of the rich rises 
at a higher rate than that of the poor. 
 In the example of a country that experiences economic 
growth, suppose that growth takes place in the aggregate and 
that everybody's real income increases. If the poor gain 5 
percent in income and the rich gain 20 percent, poverty has 
decreased (because the poor are less poor) but inequality has 
increased (because the ratio of the income of the rich to that 
of the poor is higher than it was). 
 The conclusions drawn about the change in income 
distribution depend on whether absolute poverty or relative 
inequality takes precedence in the evaluation. This article 
gives the two criteria equal weight. 
 Early research on income distribution emphasized natural 
economic laws intended to describe how income distribution 
changes with economic growth. Probably the best known is 
Kuznets' law, commonly but inaccurately paraphrased as follows: 
Income distribution must get worse before it gets better. 
 Kuznets' law dealt with relative inequality; not with 
absolute poverty. Other early studies of the effect of economic 
growth on poverty and inequality followed a similar methodology, 
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which was to look across countries and relate income 
distribution to level of national income. The cross-section 
method entailed two assumptions: that the pattern of income 
distribution at any given rime reflected the time path followed 
by the then developed countries in their growth, and that the 
rime paths followed in the past could be followed in the future. 
The reason for this methodology and its accompanying assumptions 
was quite practical: cross-sectional data were the only ones 
then available for developing countries. This precluded 
answering questions about growth and distribution by using 
intertemporal data. Some such data were then available for more 
industrialized countries (Kuznets 1963). 
 Studies in the early 1970s (such as Weisskoff 1970 and 
Fishlow 1972) began to present data on changes over time in 
inequality and poverty for individual developing countries or 
groups of countries. With these data available, the research 
task became one of synthesizing the findings on individual 
developing countries. Fields (1980) conveys data on changes in 
inequality and in poverty for thirteen developing countries. 
Fields (1988) reviews the major studies of this type. The data 
underlying this paper are presented in Fields (1989a), and the 
analysis is detailed further in Fields (1989b). 
 For reasons of practicality I measure poverty by the 
headcount ratio and inequality by the Lorenz curve and the Gini 
coefficient. A poverty line is a level of income or expenditure 
below which a recipient (expressed as household, individual, or 
per capita) is said to be poor. The headcount ratio is the 
fraction of all recipients who fall below the poverty line. The 
Lorenz curve is a method commonly used to show income 
distribution. The inequality of a country's income distribution 
in one year may be ranked against the inequality in another year 
by comparing Lorenz curves. Possible outcomes are 
Lorenz improvement {inequality has decreased according to the 
most common measures of inequality), Lorenz worsening 
(inequality has increased according to these measures), and 
Lorenz crossing {in- equality has increased according to some 
measures and decreased according to others). The most common 
measure of inequality is the Gini coefficient. In principle, it 
ranges from zero (perfect equality) to one {extreme inequality); 
in practice, the approximate range of Gini coefficients is 0.3 
to 0.7. 
 Academic economists and statisticians debate the merits of 
various indexes of inequality and poverty, but to use any 
inequality index other than the Gini coefficient would  require  
painstaking work to gather the data and compute, say, a Theil 
index. More sophisticated poverty indexes, such as the Sen 
family of indexes or the Pa class, do not exist for developing 
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countries, nor can they be produced, given the highly aggregated 
level of = published income categories. Some of the more refined 
measures of inequality and poverty will probably not exist for 
developing countries until the twenty-first century. 
 It must be recognized that the findings in this study are 
based on less than ideal data. Although the use of micro survey 
time series data is a large step forward from the use of 
aggregative cross-section data, it is only an initial step, and 
it does not resolve some critical problems. Most serious among 
these problems is that Kuznets posited long-term relations, 
spanning several generations, whereas the periods for which data 
are available are seldom longer than two decades and, on 
average, are closer to ten years. There might be evidence of 
trends, but the variation within those trends may obscure 
longer-term movements. 
 Similarly, the number of years of data available for each 
country is limited. Gini coefficients, for instance, are 
calculated using, on average, three observations per country 
(there are fourteen countries for which there is only one 
observation, and one country for which there are eight). The 
trends uncovered will depend on the years for which data are 
available; if, in the last year or two for which data are 
available, a country experiences a natural resource boom or 
election year expansion, this tends to suggest stronger overall 
growth than that which actually occurred. 
 Most of the measures of poverty and inequality on which I 
draw are based on estimated monetary income, which has two 
implications for the analysis. First, it does not deal with the 
issue of quality of life, which arises from the definition of 
poverty. It also accepts income as the best available measure of 
poverty. Given these issues, and the difficulty in measuring and 
comparing across  countries, some researchers  use  nonmonetary  
indicators  of  poverty,  such  as rates of birth, infant 
mortality, child and adult death, literacy, and school 
enrollment; life expectancy; availability of safe water and 
medical services; and caloric and protein intake (World Bank a 
and b, various years). Second, income measures may not 
adequately capture informal sector income, the value of food 
grown and consumed by the family, and other economic activity 
that goes unreported or unestimated. As an economy develops, 
however, it is expected that a larger share of income will be 
generated through the market and thus measured, so that. The 
bias should be one of extent of movement, rather than direction. 
Some of the technical aspects of measurement and data collection 
are discussed in the annex. 
 
Findings on Poverty, Inequality, and Growth 
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 This section presents seven hypotheses and findings using 
the data on inequality and poverty compiled in Fields (1989a) 
and analyzed in Fields (1989b). Many hypotheses causally link 
economic growth to inequality. Some researchers speculate that 
inequality may tend to increase systematically with economic 
growth (this is designated hypothesis 1 in the following 
discussion), that this may occur more frequently in low-income 
countries than in high-income countries (hypothesis 6), and that 
it may occur more often in Latin America than in Asia 
(hypothesis 7). Two hypotheses relate the extent of inequality 
to the extent of economic growth. One (hypothesis 2) holds that 
inequality is more likely to increase the more rapid is economic 
growth, and another (hypothesis 3) is that greater inequality in 
the initial distribution of income facilitates more rapid 
economic growth. Many of these hypotheses are not supported by 
the empirical evidence. 
 Other hypotheses, relating to poverty, are less 
controversial: that poverty tends to decrease with economic 
growth (hypothesis 4) and especially with rapid economic growth 
(hypothesis 5). These hypotheses are supported by the data. 
 In what follows, the discussion of a given country is based 
on data on that economy from the earliest date for which 
information is available. A spell is a period from a base year 
to a terminal year (both chosen according to the availability of 
data on income distribution). A growth spell is a spell in which 
a country experienced a positive rate of growth of gross 
national product (GNP) per capita. See "Units of Analysis," in 
the annex, for details. 
 Hypothesis 1. There is a systematic tendency for inequality 
to increase with economic growth. 
 Discussion and evidence. The earliest studies of the change 
in inequality in developing economies concluded that inequality 
had increased in Argentina, Mexico, and Puerto Rico (Weisskoff 
1970) and in Brazil (Fishlow 1972). This led many to conclude 
that inequality might tend to rise with economic growth in the 
developing world. Adelman and Morris (1973, pp. 1-2) did not 
equivocate: "Indeed, it has become clear that economic growth 
itself . . . is one of the prime causes of income inequality." 
Loehr and Powelson (1981, pp. 133-34) fit a linear regression 
relating the Gini coefficient in fifteen developing countries to 
their per capita GNP and found an upward-sloping relationship. 
 Both Adelman and Morris and Loehr and Powelson drew their 
conclusions from crosssectional rather than time series data. 
Studies using time series data have found little evidence to 
link inequality and growth. Ahluwalia (1974) reported data on 
changes in the income share of the poorest 40 percent of the 
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population in thirteen developing countries. He found six in 
which inequality increased, six in which inequality decreased, 
and one in which inequality was unchanged. Later evidence, 
compiled by Fields (1980) for a some- what different set of 
countries, found that inequality rose in seven countries, fell 
in five, and seemed unchanged in one. Judging from these time 
series findings, inequality seems to have increased with 
economic growth of developing countries about as often as it has 
decreased. 
 I have compiled new evidence on the change in inequality 
for twenty-two developing countries, consisting of seventy 
spells.2 In- equality is measured in two ways: by the Lorenz 
curve, which allows researchers to compare relative inequality 
regardless of the specific inequality index used; and by the 
Gini coefficient, which, despite being controversial, is 
available in many more cases. 
 The data show ten countries in which the Gini coefficient 
in- creased over time, eleven in which it decreased, and one in 
which it was unchanged. When spells are measured, the Gini 
coefficient increased in thirty-one spells, decreased in thirty-
five, and was unchanged in four. Thus, with the Gini coefficient 
as the basis for comparing inequality, the number of countries 
and spells in which inequality increased is nearly the same as 
that in which inequality decreased. 
 Lorenz curves are available for fewer countries than are 
Gini coefficients, so fewer inequality comparisons can be made. 
Those that can be made, however, are unambiguous for the class 
of Lorenz- consistent inequality measures. The evidence reveals 
five countries in which inequality increased, six in which 
inequality decreased, and six in which the results were 
ambiguous because the Lorenz curves crossed. Inequality 
increased in seventeen spells and decreased in twenty-one; the 
results for fifteen spells were ambiguous because of crossing of 
curves. The analysis by Lorenz curve yields the same conclusion 
as that by Gini coefficient: inequality increases about half the 
time and decreases about half the time. 
 Finding. Contrary to the hypothesis, the evidence shows no 
tendency for inequality to increase or decrease systematically 
with economic growth. Whether the study examines countries or 
spells, uses Lorenz curves or Gini coefficients, inequality 
appears to increase as often as it decreases. 
 Hypothesis 2. Inequality is more likely to increase the 
more rapid is economic growth. 
 Discussion and evidence. Ahluwalia (1976) attributed the 
relation between a high economic growth rate and increased 
income in- equality to short-term pressures associated with high 
growth rates. Among these pressures were lags in factor mobility 
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and consequent dispersion of income differentials. This, he 
believed, explained the increase in income inequality in Brazil 
between 1960 and 1970. 
 One set of tests by Ahluwalia was based on cross-country 
data. For each country the dependent variable was inequality as 
of the most recent date. To test the hypothesis, he included the 
rate of growth of gross domestic product (GDP) in the ten 
preceding years as an additional explanatory variable in the 
cross-section regressions. The coefficient of the growth rate 
variable was never statistically significant. He concluded that 
a higher rate of growth of GDP is not responsible for higher 
inequality. The same conclusion was reached in a more recent 
study by Papanek and Kyn (1987), also using cross-sectional 
data. 
 When intertemporal data were used in tests, the results 
were similar. Ahluwalia (1974) examined the change in inequality 
in eighteen industrial and developing countries and related the 
changes to the rate of growth of national income. He found that 
"there is no strong pattern relating changes in the distribution 
of income to the rate of growth of GNP. In both high-growth and 
low-growth countries, there are some which have experienced 
improvements and others that have experienced deteriorations in 
relative equality" (p. 13). Subsequently, I reached the same 
conclusion, using a sample of six developing countries for which 
the data on changes in in- equality over time were more reliable 
(Fields 1980, table 7.2). Thus the intertemporal data and the 
cross-sectional data yield the same result: "the absence of any 
marked relationship between income growth and changes in income 
shares" (Ahluwalia 1974, p. 13). 
 To see whether newer data support the hypothesis linking  
economic growth with income inequality, data were divided into 
spells in which the Gini coefficient increased, spells in which 
it decreased, and spells in which it was unchanged. Growth rates 
of GNP per capita and of internationally comparable purchasing 
power (ICP) were calculated for as many of these spells as 
possible. The growth rates among spells in which the Gini 
coefficient increased vary widely, as do the growth rates among 
spells in which the Gini coefficient decreased. This result 
suggests that inequality need not increase with rapid economic 
growth. 
 Despite the lack of a pattern, there may be some tendency, 
as seen by comparing the average growth rate during spells in 
which inequality increased with that during spells in which 
inequality de- creased. The data show that the average growth 
rate of GNP is somewhat lower in those spells in which 
inequality increased than in those in which inequality 
decreased. If the average growth rate of ICP is the criterion, 
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the opposite seems true: the growth rate is higher in those 
spells during which inequality increased than in those during 
which inequality decreased. Further tests, however, showed no 
statistically significant relation between the rate of growth 
during a spell and the tendency for inequality to increase or 
decrease. (Probit analysis relating an increase in the Gini 
coefficient [Pr(D=1)] to growth of GNP per capita and to growth 
of ICP per capita produced probit coefficients of 3.14 [t-
statistic of 0.64] and -1.96 [0.37] respectively.) 
 Finding. The evidence is mixed. In tests using the growth 
rate of GN P as an indicator, more rapid economic growth is 
associated with lower inequality, whereas inequality is seen to 
increase when the growth rate of ICP is used. Neither result, 
however, is statistically significant. These results do not 
support the claim that inequality is more likely to increase the 
more rapid is economic growth. 
 Hypothesis 3. The less even the initial distribution of 
income, the higher is the economic growth rate. 
 Discussion and evidence. According to the Harrod Domar 
model, if the rich save and invest much of their income and the 
poor spend most of theirs, then savings, investment, capital 
formation, and hence growth will be higher the larger is the 
initial income share of the rich. This argument has been 
repeated by others, including Griffin and Khan (1972) and 
Sheehan (1980), who argued that high growth requires the 
enrichment of high-income investors, managers, and landowners. 
 To test this hypothesis, the average growth rate of GNP per 
capita for each spell was plotted against the Gini coefficient 
for the initial year of the spell; these variables appear to be 
uncorrelated. (The Pearson correlation coefficient was -0.16, 
not significantly different from zero.) A similar plot of growth 
rate of ICP against initial Gini coefficient yields a 
correlation coefficient of -0.14. Correlation coefficients so 
close to zero suggest that inequality in the distribution of 
income is not a force behind economic growth. 
 Finding: I uncover no statistically significant relation 
between inequality in the initial distribution of income and the 
subsequent rate of economic growth. 
 Hypothesis 4. Poverty tends to decrease with economic 
growth. 
 Discussion and evidence. Two views of poverty and growth 
are usually put forward. The optimistic position is that the 
poor do participate in economic growth and that absolute poverty 
is thus reduced. Development economists in the 1950s and 1960s 
assumed that growth would reduce absolute poverty, which is why 
growth consumed the attention of development economists, whereas 
poverty was rarely examined directly. 
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 The more pessimistic position is that the poor do not 
necessarily, or even usually, participate in economic growth.  
At best, growth does not benefit all of the poor. Griffin 
(1977), for instance, showed which groups of poor did not enjoy 
income gains (absolutely or relatively) during economic growth 
in various countries. Even if the gains among the poor as a 
group outweigh the losses among them, resulting in a decline in 
the rate of poverty or in its severity, it is clear that not 
everyone benefits.  
 A more interesting issue is whether the poor tend 
systematically to be excluded from economic growth and thereby 
to be rendered poorer. Adelman and Morris (1973), using cross-
sectional evidence, wrote, "Our conclusions . . . underline the 
urgent need to discard as outmoded the view that economic growth 
in low-income countries benefits the masses. . . . Development 
is accompanied by an absolute as well as a relative decline in 
the average income of the very poor" (pp. 3, 189). Their 
methodology, however, has been severely criticized by many, such 
as Cline (1975), as being "indirect" and thus suspect. Their 
empirical claim that poverty rose in the cross-section was 
rejected by Ahluwalia (1976), who showed that when countries at 
different income levels were compared, the aver- age absolute 
incomes of the poorest 20 percent, 40 percent, and 60 percent 
increased monotonically. The idea that absolute impoverishment 
arose from economic growth was laid to rest, at least in studies 
using cross-sectional data. 
 What about intertemporal data? After all, the hypothesis 
that growth reduces poverty is really one about changes in 
countries over time. Working independently, Ahluwalia, Carter, 
and Chenery (1979) and Fields (1980) found that economic growth 
accompanied by an increase in poverty is the exception. In the 
former study, data from twelve countries showed no instance of 
an increase in poverty: real per capita income increased among 
the poorest 20 percent in each case. In the latter study, 
poverty was found to decrease in ten out of thirteen countries, 
to increase in two, and to exhibit no dear change in one. In one 
of the two cases in which poverty rose, economic growth was 
negative. In the case in which poverty was constant, economic 
growth was negligible. In only one case was poverty found to 
rise in a growing economy. Inter evidence therefore indicates 
that economic growth tends to reduce poverty. 
 In the 1980s, many developing countries have had negative 
economic growth. If economic growth tends to lower poverty, then 
economic decline should increase poverty. A number of studies 
(for example, Addison and Demery 1985, World Bank 1986, Edgren 
and Muqtada 1986, ECLAC 1986, Tokman and Wurgaft 1987, Aboagye 
and Gozo 1987, Lee 1987, and UNICEF 1987) suggest that this is 
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the case. The statistical basis for these claims, however, is 
considerably less than ideal. 
 Data compiled for this article can be used to test the 
hypothesis that economic growth tends to reduce poverty. Of the 
eighteen countries with consistent data on poverty over time, 6 
poverty fell in fourteen, rose in three, and exhibited no clear 
tendency in one. In two of the three cases in which poverty 
rose, the economy had suffered an economic decline. In only one 
case was positive economic growth not accompanied by a fall in 
poverty. 
 Finding. The hypothesis is supported by the evidence 
considered here: In almost all cases poverty declines as the 
economies grow. 
 Hypothesis 5. Poverty is more apt to decrease the more 
rapid is economic growth. 
 Discussion and evidence. If there were a standard 
international poverty line, the extent of poverty reduction 
could be measured and related to countries' rates of economic 
growth. But it makes little sense to compare the percentage 
change in poverty across countries using each country's own 
poverty line; to do so would be like comparing apples and 
oranges. Given the limitations of the data, it is better to look 
at whether poverty increased or decreased rather than to try to 
determine the extent of change. 
 The data reveal that in all but one spell with a growth 
rate above 3 percent, poverty was found to decrease. The 
instances of increase in poverty or mixed evidence were 
concentrated in the spells with GN P decline or with growth 
rates of less than 3 percent. When the change in poverty is 
related to the growth rate of ICP, the data tell the same story. 
 Tests run on these findings reveal that the effect of high 
growth on poverty reduction is statistically significant at 
conventional levels. (Probits relating the decline in poverty 
[one if there was a decline, zero if not] to the growth rate of 
GNP or ICP yielded probit coefficients of +0.325 f t-statistic 
of 2.36] for GNP and + 0.420 (2.16) for ICP.) 
 Finding.  The data suggest that poverty is more apt to 
decrease the more rapid is economic growth. 
 Hypothesis 6.  Growth tends to raise inequality in low-
income countries and to reduce inequality in high-income 
countries. 
 Discussion and evidence. Kuznets (1955) measured inequality 
in five countries and found greater inequality in industrial 
countries than in developing ones. This result was sustained in 
later studies of larger samples of countries, first by Kravis 
(1960) and then by Kuznets (1963). Both Kuznets and Oshima 
(1962) reasoned that developing countries had greater equality 
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in their earlier stages of development because everyone was 
thought to be more or less equally poor. From this emerged the 
hypothesis of the Kuznets curve-the idea that income inequality 
increases in the early stages of economic development and 
decreases in the later stages, thus tracing an inverted U. 
 The Kuznets curve has received support in cross-sectional 
studies by Paukert (1973), Cline (1975), Chenery and Syrquin 
(1975), Ahluwalia (1976), and Papanek and Kyn (1987), among 
others. In an econometric study allowing for various functional 
forms, however, Anand and Kanbur (1986) found that the cross-
sectional data were best fit by a U-shaped curve, not an 
inverted U. In any event, regardless of which cross-sectional 
pattern is correct, the hypothesis that growth raises inequality 
in low-income countries and lowers it in higher-income countries 
is a statement about change over time and is properly tested 
using intertemporal data. Only recently has there been 
sufficient data on changes in inequality over time in various 
countries' development experiences to permit this hypothesis to 
be tested intertemporally. 
 To determine the effect of growth on inequality in the 
high-income and low-income groups, a spell is included here if 
it is a growth spell (spells of economic decline are omitted). 
The division between high-income and low-income countries was 
set at US$728 in 1980 prices; this is the level of GNP in 1980 
prices at which income inequality was found to have peaked in 
the cross-sectional study by Paukert (1973). 
 In low-income countries, ten out of twenty-one growth 
spells (48 percent) were marked by an increase in inequality. In 
high-income countries, it was nine out of twenty-two (42 
percent). These two percentages are not significantly different 
from one another. 
 Finding. In the data considered here, inequality increased 
with growth as frequently in low-income countries as in high-
income countries. There appears to be no tendency for inequality 
to increase more in the early stages of economic development 
than in the later stages. 
 Hypothesis 7. Growth tends to bring about an increase in 
inequality more in Latin America than in Asia. 
 Discussion and evidence. Inequality is higher in Latin 
America than in Asia (Ahluwalia, Carter, and Chenery 1979, p. 
482; Loehr and Powelson 1981, p. 134). It is generally thought 
that the Asian economies with rapid economic growth (Japan, Hong 
Kong, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan) have had 
more equal distribution of land, capital, and education than 
have Latin American countries and that these Asian economies 
have engaged in much more labor-intensive production than have 
the newly industrializing countries of Latin America (Ranis 
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1981). It might be expected, then, that the fruits of growth are 
distributed more equitably in Asia than in Latin America. 
 The work of Ahluwalia, Carter, and Chenery (1979) supports 
this contention. Using data over time, these authors classified 
countries into three groups (with good, intermediate, and poor 
performance) based on the income share of the poorest 60 percent  
of the population in the latest year and the share of increase 
in income going to this group. The performance of Asian 
economies is generally good, and that of Latin American 
countries generally poor. 
 To test my data, I divided the growth spells (those in 
which GN P growth was positive) by region. In five out of the 
nine Latin American growth spells, the Gini coefficient 
increased; the Gini coefficient increased in twelve out of 
twenty-eight Asian growth spells. That is, the Gini coefficient 
increased in 55 percent of the Latin American growth spells and 
in 43 percent of the Asian growth spells. These differences, 
though notable, are not statistically significant. 
 Finding. Although inequality appears to have increased with 
growth more frequently in Latin America than in Asia, the 
results do not differ statistically. 
 
Conclusions and Directions for Future Work 
 
 In this analysis economic growth nearly always is 
associated with a reduction in absolute poverty.  There are 
exceptions, but the tendency is for the poor to be rendered less 
poor by economic growth and poorer by macroeconomic decline. 
 No relation is found between the change in inequality and 
the rate of economic growth or between the change in inequality 
and the level of national income. This suggests that the 
decisive factor in determining whether inequality increases or 
decreases is not the rate of economic growth but rather the kind 
of growth. 
 No statistically significant relation is found between 
inequality in the initial distribution of income and subsequent 
economic growth. This suggests that countries need not maintain 
unequal income distribution to grow rapidly. 
 Most countries have had very modest changes in income 
inequality over time.  This suggests that, in most cases, 
different income groups have benefited from economic growth (or 
suffered from economic decline) approximately in proportion to 
their original incomes. 
 It is hoped that future work on this subject will be able 
to take advantage of internationally comparable standards for 
inequality or poverty, so that cross-country comparisons will be 
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more meaningful. Future data-gathering efforts should be more 
standardized. 
 It has not always been possible to confirm the 
comparability of sources within a country. Those more 
knowledgeable about a particular country's household survey or 
census program may have good reason to question comparability. 
Further in-depth study of individual country sources is in 
order. In this study minimal criteria for the exclusion of data 
have been used. 8 Yet even these criteria have been criticized 
as excessively stringent. I would not feel confident with 
findings based on anything looser. 
 At present, the data offer much more information on 
inequality in developing countries than on poverty. This does 
not reflect my personal priorities or those of many others-I 
would first calculate poverty rates  and only later worry about 
inequality-but rather the priorities of the countries' 
statistical offices or researchers them- selves. For the world's 
preeminent development institution not to have data on changes 
in poverty in developing countries is shocking. The improvement 
of the data base on poverty merits the highest priority. 
 
Annex: Data Used for This Article 
 
 Data on income distribution in developing countries were 
sought in numerous sources, including papers from the World 
Bank's research project on the political economy of poverty, 
equity, and growth (Bevan, Collier, and  Gunning  1988; Bruton  
1988; Favaro and Bension 1988; Findlay, Wellisz, and  others  
1988; Gonzalez-Vega and Cespedes 1988; Hansen 1988a, 1988b; 
Maddison and others 1988a, 1988b;  Meesook,  Tinakorn,  and   
Vaddhanaphuti 1987; Pryor 1988; Urdinola and Carrizosa 1988; and 
Webb 1988); World Bank a 1988; World Bank b 1987; Jain 1975; 
Adelman and Morris 1973; Paukert 1973; United Nations 1981, 
1985; Interna- tional Labour Office 1984; Fields 1980; World 
Bank country eco- nomic memoranda; and statistical yearbooks,  
reports  on  censuses and household surveys, and research 
studies. 
 Data were found in one or more of these sources for seventy 
developing economies in Africa, Asia (including Oceania), and 
Latin America (including the Caribbean). For exactly half of 
these countries, no data were deemed usable, because they did 
not satisfy the criteria listed in note 8. Those that did are 
described in the following. 
 
Units of Analysis 
 Different units of analysis were used to test the 
hypotheses in this article. The choice depended on the 
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particular hypothesis and the availability of data with which to 
answer it. The following terminology is used: 
 A country refers to the experience of an economy from the 
earliest possible date for which information is available 
until the latest date. "Costa Rica, 1961-82" is one such 
country. 
 A spell refers to the experience of an economy from a base 
year (chosen for the availability of data) until a terminal 
year (chosen in the same way). The experience of a country 
may be divided into one or more spells. For instance, Costa 
Rica has four spells: 1961-71, 1971-77, 1977-79, and 1979-
82. 
 A growth spell is a spell in which the country experienced 
a positive rate of growth of GNP per capita. Costa Rica 
experienced positive economic growth in the intervals 1961-
71, 1971- 77, and 1977-79 and suffered a serious economic 
recession in the interval 1979-82. The first three of these 
are growth spells; the fourth is not. 
 
Income Level and Income Growth 
 Although some of the hypotheses relate only to the passage 
of time, others relate to the level of GNP or to the rate of 
economic growth. These data were taken from various sources. 
 The GNP data are for GNP per capita, measured in 1980 U.S. 
dollars. These are taken from International Monetary Fund 1984. 
 The growth rates of GNP were calculated from data for 1960-
86 from World Bank 1988. Comparable GNP figures for earlier and 
later years were unavailable. Most of the economies included in 
the data used in this article are also included in International 
Monetary Fund 1984 and World Bank 1988. The Bahamas and Puerto 
Rico, however, are not. Although GNPs and GNP growth rates for 
these economies are available elsewhere, in view of other 
noncomparabilities in GNP data, these other sources were not 
included here. 
 As an alternative basis for estimating economic growth, I 
used the data from the International Comparison Project, as 
reported in Summers and Heston (1988) and as described there and 
in Kravis (1986). These estimates avert a number of problems, 
the most important of which is the distortion introduced by 
using official ex- change rates to convert GNP in local currency 
to GNP in dollars (the standard numeraire). 
 The countries, spells, and dates covered by the ICP growth 
rates differ from those for the GN P growth rates.  The findings 
on in-growth rates. The findings on inequality, poverty, and 
economic growth presented in the following are more convincing 
insofar as the two growth estimates and the two different sets 
of countries and spells yield qualitatively similar results. 
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Availability of Data 
 Usable data on income distribution are available for a 
large number of developing economies. World Bank sources should 
be ex- panded to incorporate more of these data. 
 Much of the available information fails to fulfill minimal 
criteria of acceptability. It is impossible, however, readily to 
determine this from the sources themselves. It is only by 
looking into more basic sources, one country at a time, that the 
acceptability of the data can be determined. 
 The information contained in the papers of the project on 
poverty, equity, and growth proved to be quite limited. Of the 
papers available at the time of this writing (on twenty 
countries), those on only ten of the project countries were 
found to offer national data on the change in inequality over 
time, and data on changes in absolute poverty were available for 
only five countries. To assess how growth affects inequality and 
poverty, we must turn elsewhere for additional information. 
 When suitable income distribution data do exist, the form 
of presentation of the data-especially of data on poverty-is 
very limited. 
 Among the thirty-five countries for which suitable data on 
inequality or poverty (or both) were found, usable information 
was located for at least two years in the case of twenty-two 
countries and for one year in the case of thirteen. For many of 
these countries, data for other years existed but were deemed 
unusable. A full listing of the data on Gini coefficients and 
absolute poverty and of the relevant sources may be found in an 
earlier report (Fields 1989a). 
 
Desired Measures and the Practical Resolution 
 Academics who have been studying how growth affects 
inequality and poverty have long wrestled with questions about 
conceptual measurement that would need to be resolved if one 
were starting from scratch and devising a time series on poverty 
or inequality or both. Among the points to be decided are the 
preferred recipient unit (individual, household, or per capita), 
the preferred income concept (cash income, income including 
imputations, expenditure, or per capita income), the preferred 
poverty measure (the headcount ratio, the Sen index and 
generalizations therefrom, or the Pa class Class suggested by 
Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke 1984), and the preferred inequality 
measure (income share of the richest or poorest x percent, Gini 
coefficient, Theil index, Atkinson index). 
 Inequality analysts wish to know about Lorenz curves and 
Lorenz-based inequality indexes. Lorenz curves are rarely 
presented, nor, often, is the information needed to compute 
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Lorenz curves. As for the Lorenz-based inequality indexes, if we 
are lucky, Gini coefficients are already calculated. If we are 
less lucky, we have the information from which we can calculate 
our own Gini coefficients. Sometimes we cannot even do that. 
 As for poverty indexes, most countries have not published 
such data. In the few cases where this information has been 
published, it has .typically been a headcount ratio-the fraction 
that is poor according to some poverty line. In some cases, the 
changes in different groups' real incomes are available instead. 
The fraction that is poor can be calculated for many more 
countries than it has been, but to do so will be difficult and 
tedious: the underlying income distributions, poverty lines, 
inflation rates, and intragroup distributions will have to be 
determined country by country, year by year. To have such 
information is essential. Not to have it is deplorable. 
 In sum, what we have are Gini coefficients to measure 
inequality and, typically, headcount ratios to measure poverty. 
Those data constitute the basis for the statistical analysis 
presented in this article. 
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